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Abstract: 
 
We investigate the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort, wage formation 
and employment with stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares 
are determined through simultaneous negotiations. The negotiated profit share depends 
positively on the relative bargaining power of trade unions and it has both effort-
enhancing and wage -moderating effects. Higher profit sharing is shown to reduce 
equilibrium unemployment under sufficiently ‘rigid’ labour market institutions, i.e. 
sufficiently high benefit-replacement ratios and relative bargaining powers of trade 
unions. Conversely, profit sharing seems to be destructive from the point of view of 
employment when the labour market ‘rigidities’ are sufficiently small. 
 
Keywords : Wage bargaining, profit sharing, efficiency wages, equilibrium 
unemployment. 
JEL classification: J51, J41, G32. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Profit sharing refers to performance -related remuneration mechanisms consisting 
of a base wage plus a share of profits or revenues of firms. Profit sharing is an 
empirically important phenomenon in many OECD countries. The OECD Employment 
Outlook (1995) reports cross-country evidence on the incidence of profit sharing in 
OECD countries. Pendleton et. al (2001) present more recent and detailed data on the 
large proportion of workplaces with financial employee participation, in particular in the 
form of profit sharing schemes, in EU-countries. This information is illustrated in Figure 
1.  
In some countries with particularly extensive profit sharing systems, like France, 
public policy explicitly encourages profit sharing. For further detailed evidence regarding 
the incidence of profit sharing we refer to DICE database collected by CESifo, 
http://www.CESifo.de, Wadhwani and Wall (1990) as well as Cahuc and Dormont 
(1997).  As profit sharing schemes are nowadays commonly used, it is important to study 
their implications for wage formation and equilibrium unemployment.  
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Figure 1. Workplaces with Profit Sharing in Percent, 1999/2000
 Source:  Pendleton, A., Poutsma, E., van Ommeren, J., Brewster, C., Employee Profit Sharing in 
 the  European Union, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
              Conditions, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 
 2001 
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In a widespread book written for a broad audience Weitzman (1984) proposes 
profit sharing systems for economies facing unemployment and stagflation problems. In 
Weitzman (1985) and Weitzman (1986) the arguments are presented in a more rigorous 
way. In these articles Weitzman conjectures that profit sharing systems would both 
dampen the business cycle fluctuations of employment and reduce equilibrium 
unemployment.  
Holmlund (1991) has formally explored some key aspects of the relationship 
between profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment. He argues that the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital is a crucial determinant for the employment 
implications of profit sharing. More precisely, profit sharing will reduce (increase) 
equilibrium unemployment if and only if the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital exceeds (falls short of) one, while it will have no effect on equilibrium 
unemployment when the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is equal to 
one. Layard and Nickell (1990) show a similar neutrality result in the case of a Cobb-
Douglas production function and efficient bargaining. One important assumption in 
Holmlund’s analysis is that the benefit-replacement ratio is proportional to the total 
compensation, including not only the base wage but also a component contingent on the 
firm’s performance. In a model with capital stock decisions, Jerger and Michaelis (1999) 
develop this approach further and show how a switch from a fixed wage economy to a 
share economy may, in fact, decrease aggregate unemployment with the Cobb-Douglas 
production function when the outside option does not include the profit sharing. 
However, in all these contributions, which focus on a world with no uncertainty, the 
profit sharing instrument is assumed to have no incentive effect on the effort decisions. 
But this does not lie in conformity with empirical evidence according to which profit 
sharing enhances effort provision and thereby productivity (see e.g. Wadhwani and Wall 
(1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997) and Booth and Frank (1999)). 
In this paper we incorporate the productivity effect of profit sharing into our 
model in an environment with firms facing revenue uncertainty and highlight that also 
factors other than the nature of the production technology are important in an evaluation 
of the employment implications of profit sharing. We do this by focusing on a production 
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technology with unit elasticity of substitution between labour and capital – the case 
where profit sharing would have no employment effect in the absence of productivity 
effects as established by Holmlund (1991), Layard and Nickell (1990) or Jerger and 
Michaelis (1999). In this way we are able to combine and unify elements from union 
bargaining and efficiency wage theories - approaches which have typically represented 
separate lines in the literature – so that we can explore the implications of profit sharing 
in a more realistic way, which lies in conformity with empirics.   
Our analysis will offer a characterization of how the employment implications of 
profit sharing depend on the interplay between labour market policies and labour market 
imperfections. We will prove that profit sharing will stimulate employment under 
conditions with a sufficiently high unemployment benefit replacement ratio and 
sufficiently strong labour market imperfections due to the bargaining power of trade 
unions. In line with the terminology used by, for example, Nickell (1997) we will refer to 
these circumstances as sufficiently strong labour market 'rigidities'. Under such 
circumstances profit sharing will induce moderations of the base wages and thereby boost 
aggregate employment. Conversely, we also show that profit sharing will have negative 
employment effects if the labour market 'rigidities' are sufficiently low. The interpretation 
of these results goes as follows. Profit sharing has a wage-moderating effect directly and 
also indirectly via the benefit replacement ratio, which is part of the outside option. 
Moreover, it has a direct positive effect on the performance-related part of the outside 
option. The higher is the benefit-replacement ratio, the more likely profit sharing will 
affect equilibrium unemployment negatively.   
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the model as well 
as the time sequence of decisions under circumstances where a firm operates in an 
environment characterized by uncertainty. The determination of effort by employees and 
the employment decisions by firms are studied in section III. In section IV we investigate 
the determination of base wages and profit shares through negotiations in the presence of 
efficiency wage considerations. Section V explores the implications of profit sharing for 
equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we present concluding comments in section VI. 
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II.  Basic Framework  
 
We consider a firm operating in an environment characterized by revenue  
uncertainty. In conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis we assume that the output 
of the firm depends not only on the number of workers employed, but also on the effort 
supplied by each worker, i.e. productivity. By employing L  units of labour, each 
providing effort denoted by a , the stochastic revenues accruing to the firm are given by  
 
),()1( LaRq , 
 
where q  denotes a random revenue shock with a cumulative distribution function )(qF , 
and a density function )(qf , with the support [ ] +Í Rmaxmin ,qq . We assume that the 
production function ),( LaR  satisfies the following conventional properties: 
0,0,0,0 <><> LLLaaa RRRR  and .0>aLR  Hence, labour and effort are 
complementary factors of production.   
The profit share, t , determines what fraction of the firm’s profits is transferred to 
employed workers as part of the contract. Since we are interested in the implications of 
productivity effect of profit sharing in conventional models of profit sharing, we assume, 
in line with Holmlund (1991), Layard and Nickell (1990) and Jerger and Michaelis 
(1999), that profit share and base wage, w, are negotiated simultaneously between labour 
market organizations subject to labour demand and effort determination. This means that 
the firm unilaterally determines the employment level and the employee the effort level 
once the conditions of the negotiations have been settled. In line with the tradition of 
efficiency wage models, we assume that the representative union member decides on 
effort so as to maximize his objective function, which importantly captures the notion 
that that effort provision causes disutility. As the trade union are formed by homogenous 
agents and as intra-organizational agency issues within the union are outside the scope of 
our analysis, the union is assumed to be able to enforce the effort provision by the 
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representative union member so as to eliminate the potential free rider problems.1 At the 
stage of the base wage and profit share negotiations the negotiated partners hold rational 
expectations regarding how the outcome of the bargaining will impact on employment 
and effort. 
We summarize the timing of the decisions made by the firm, the union and the 
representative union member in Figure 2. In the subsequent sections we turn to the  
analysis of the decisions taking place at the different stages of the firm-union interaction 
by solving the game in reverse order.  
              Stage 1                   Stage 2                  Stage 3                 
                    Nw                        L                     q      
       t                       a  
·                      x                             x                                x                         time  
 
 
          wage and profit     employment       resolution of  
                        share bargaining   effort provision           of uncertainty   
 
Figure 2: Time sequence of decisions  
 
III. Labour Demand and Equilibrium Effort  
 
We assume that the firm finances its activities by equity financing so that the 
effective cost of labour is wLr)1( + , where w  denotes the wage rate and L  is 
employment. From the firm’s point of view r  denotes the opportunity cost of capital. 
Under these circumstances the risk-neutral firm decides on employment L  so as to 
maximize the expected profits 
ò +-=
max
min
)())1(),((),()2(
q
q
qqqp dfLrwLaRLaE  
                                                               
1 If we were to apply an alternative formulation where individual efforts were not directly observable and 
workers were heterogenous, group punishment or reward schemes would have to be used for enforcement 
(see e.g. Holmström (1982)). This is an interesting and important issue for further research. 
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Conditional on the negotiated base wage and profit share contract the risk-neutral 
representative employed union member makes the effort decision in order to maximize 
the expected utility 
( ) ),()()1(),(),()3(
max
min
agdfLrwLaR
L
wLaEu -ò +-+= qqq
t q
q
 
where the increasing and convex function )(ag ( 0)(''),(' >agag ) describes the disutility 
of effort. 
The optimal combination of employment and effort provision is determined by 
the system of first-order conditions 
0)1()(),()4(
max
min
=+-ò
q
q
qqq rwdfLaRL  
and 
(5)  0)(')(),(
max
min
=-ò agdfLaRL a
q
q
qqq
t
. 
 
According to equation (4) the firm chooses the employment level so as to equalize the 
expected marginal return from labour (the integral term qqq
q
q
dfLaRL )(),(
max
min
ò ) to the 
effective wage cost (the term )1( rw + ). Equation (5) characterizes the determination of 
effort by a representative employee so as to equalize the expected marginal benefit from 
effort (the integral term qqq
t q
q
dfLaR
L a
)(),(
max
min
ò )) to the marginal disutility of effort (the 
term )).(' ag  
In order to highlight, and make the comparison of results with the earlier literature 
more transparent, we make the following two assumptions regarding the functional forms 
of the production technology and the disutility of employee effort.  
For the production technology we make  
Assumption R: The technology is assumed to satisfy 
  
a
a)(),( LaLaR =    . 
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The parameter a  is restricted to 10 << a . Thus specification (R) describes a concave 
production function exhibiting decreasing returns to scale with effort and employment, 
separated as complementary production factors.   
For the disutility of employee effort we ma ke 
 
Assumption G: The disutility of effort belongs to the class of iso-elastic  functions 
gg 1)( aag =  with .10 << g  
 
This lies in conformity with the earlier discussion according to which the disutility of 
effort can be captured through an increasing and convex relationship.   
Under assumptions R and G the equilibrium condition (4) with respect to the 
employment decision can be simplified to yield )1(1 rwLa +=- qaa , where q  
denotes the expected value of revenue shock. This can be written as follows 
 
[ ] 1* )1()6( --+= hhhq arwL   , 
 
where 1)1(1 >-= ah  denotes the direct wage elasticity of labour demand.  According to 
(6) labour demand depends negatively on the effective labour cost and positively on the 
effort of employees.   
    Analogously, under the assumptions made we can rewrite (5) according to 
.)(
1
1
1
-
- = ga qt aaL  Thus, the optimal effort is found to be given by   
 
[ ]gt )1()7( * rwa +=   , 
 
according to which the optimal effort depends positively on the effective labour cost 
including the base wage and the cost of capital as well as on profit share.  
 We can now summarize our characterization of the optimal combination of 
employment and effort provision in 
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Proposition 1 Labour demand depends negatively on the effective labour cost and 
positively on the effort of employees, while effort by employees depends positively on the 
profit share, the base wage as well as the cost of capital. 
 
Equation (6) suggests that labour demand does not directly depend on profit sharing, 
which lies in conformity with empirical evidence (see e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990)) 
and Cahuc and Dormont (1997)). Instead profit sharing enhances productivity by 
stimulating effort provision and through that mechanism profit sha ring might possibly 
promote employment. The effective wage cost, )1( rw + , impacts negatively on labour 
demand and in the presence of profit sharing this increases the returns of effort provision. 
From (7) we can conclude that the optimal effort provision depends on profit sharing in a 
way, which reminds of the principal-agent literature. These aspects have not previously 
been explored in the literature concerning union-firm wage bargaining.  
Some aspects of the interactions between wage bargaining and efficiency wage 
considerations have previously been analyzed in Lindbeck and Snower (1991), Sanfey 
(1993), Summers (1988) and Garino and Martin (2000). In contrast to our analysis, in 
these papers the effort function is assumed ad hoc and not derived from optimal 
behaviour. In Hendricks and Kahn (1991) the effort function is derived from optimal 
behaviour, but they do not explore the implications for equilibrium unemployment, which 
is our focus. Alterburg and Straub (1998) incorporate the efficiency wage considerations 
derived from optimal behaviour into an extended shirking model of the Shapiro-Stiglitz 
(1984) type with decentralized union bargaining. In such a context they study the 
relationship between aggregate labour market equilibrium and the benefit-replacement 
ratio. Like us they abstract from potential free-rider problems associated with effort 
determination, but they do not explore the employment implications of profit sharing. 
Bulkley and Myles (1996) have also studied the interaction between union power and 
shirking, but they confine attention to a pa rtial equilibrium analysis.       
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IV. Base Wage and Profit Share Negotiation 
 
We now turn to analyze the base wage and the profit share negotiations.  We 
apply the Nash bargaining solution within the context of the 'right-to-manage' approach 
according to which employment is unilaterally determined by the firm, whereas effort is 
provided subject to the discretion of employees.  
We denote the relative bargaining power of the union by b , and that of the firm 
by ( )b-1 . In line with (3) the objective function of the trade union under risk neutrality 
can be written as   
 
)()(ˆ agLbLNE
L
wLUE --+úû
ù
êë
é += pt , 
 
where the first term captures the benefits from employment to employed workers, the 
second term the benefits for unemployed union members and the last term denotes the 
disutility of effort for employed union members. We assume that the threat points of the 
union and the firm are NbEU o =  and ,0=oEp  respectively. Thus, the difference 
oEUUELaEUEU -== ˆ),( **  denotes the expected rent of the trade union relative to 
the threat point. At the stage of bargaining the expected profits and the expected rent of 
the union are evaluated at the equilibrium combination of effort and employment.   
Applying the traditional Nash bargaining solution the negotiating parties decide 
on w and t  in order to solve  
 
{ [ ] [ ] bb
t
pt --=W 1
),(
)1()8( EEUMax
w
 
 
subject to the labour demand (6) and the effort determination (7). In the Nash maximand 
(8) ),( ** LaEE pp = denotes the expected profit of the firm adjusted with the factor 
)1( t-  in order to take the impact of profit sharing into account.  
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In anticipation of the equilibrium with respect to effort provision and employment 
the expected profit of the firm can be written as  
 
,)1(
1
1)9( *LrwE +
-
=
h
p  
 
The calculation of the union’s expected rent captures the idea that all the N 
workers have incentives to seek employment. Those union members who are left 
unemployed due to the limitations of the firm’s production have the outside option b. 
Thus the rent of the union, EU, is calculated to be  
 
.)(),(),()10( ****** úû
ù
êë
é -+-== agLaE
L
bwLLaEUEU pt  
   
The Nash bargaining solution has to satisfy the following first-order conditions  
 
0)1()11( =-+
p
p
bb
E
E
EU
UE
a ww  
0
1
1
)1()11( =
-
-
--+
t
b
p
p
bb tt
E
E
EU
UE
b , 
 
where the subscripts w and t  denote the partial derivatives with respect to the wage rate 
and the profit share, respectively.2 According to equations (11a) and (11b) the Nash 
bargaining wage rate and profit share are affected by the  relative bargaining powers as 
well as by the relative effects of the wage rate and profit share on the objective functions 
of the negotiating agents.  
 We first study the determinants of the negotiated base wage .Nw We find that the 
Nash bargaining solution, Nw , can be expressed through the implicit representation  
                                                               
2 We assume that the sufficient second-order conditions for the Nash bargaining solution (i) 
0, <WW ttww  and (ii) 0>WW-WW wwww tttt  hold.  
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)(
1
)1(
1
1
1
)1(
1
1
1
)12( *
*
agrbrw
N
-
+
+
+
-
+
+
-
+
=
h
t
h
t
h
b
, 
where ghhh )1(*
*
* --=-=
L
Lw w  denotes the total wage elasticity of labour demand. This 
incorporates both the direct negative employment effect of an increased wage and the 
indirect positive effect whereby by a wage increase stimulates effort provision.  
In general, and unlike the earlier literature, (12) captures the idea that profit 
sharing has two opposite effects on the negotiated base wage. On the one hand, it tends to 
induce wage moderation as part of the compensation is shifted to the performance-related 
profit share. On the other hand, the effort-enhancing effects of profit sharing will also 
increase the costs of effort provision (the term )( *ag ) and thereby increase the 
“individual rationality” constraint of each union member, which will have a positive 
effect on the wage rate, ceteris paribus. By substituting the optimal effort (7) into (12) the 
Nash bargaining solution can be expressed in explicit form as follows  
 
b
r
wN
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
++
-
+
=
g
h
t
h
b
1
1
)1(1
1
1
)13(
*
    .  
 
For the details of the calculations leading to (13) we refer to Appendix A. We can infer 
from (13) that the negotiated wage rate is proportional to the outside option b. The 
negotiated wage rate increases with the bargaining power of the union, and decreases as a 
function of the total wage elasticity of labour demand. These effects coincide with those 
of conventional wage bargaining models except for the generalization that the total 
elasticity of labour demand incorporates an efficiency wage aspect of profit sharing.  This 
effect will increase the base wage through the added disutility of effort. Under the 
plausible assumption that the wage-moderating effect dominates relative to the cost of 
effort provision, i.e. if 1)1( <- gh , we can now summarize our analysis in  
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Proposition 2: The Nash bargaining solution for the negotiated base wage is 
proportional to the outside option available to the union, increasing in the bargaining 
power of the union, and decreasing in the total wage elasticity of labour demand. 
Furthermore, profit sharing will moderate the negotiated base wage if 1)1( <- gh .    
 
The negotiated base wage  (13) interestingly represents a generalization along several 
dimensions relative to the traditional Nash bargaining solution. Our analysis with the 
Nash bargaining solution (13) simultaneously includes efficiency wage considerations 
like in Altenburg and Straub (1999), Bulkley and Myles (1996), Lindbeck and Snower 
(1991) and Sanfey (1993) and the price of capital like in Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998). 
But these models do not include profit sharing as an incentive device. Holmlund (1991), 
Layard and Nickell (1990) and Jerger and Michaelis (1999) analyze the effect of profit 
sharing on the base wage rate, but their models do not incorporate the effort aspect of 
profit sharing. In light of empirical evidence it is important to incorporate the 
productivity effects of profit sharing in an evaluation of the employment effects of profit 
sharing.  
 The generalized Nash bargaining solution (13) implies several interesting special 
cases enabling interesting comparisons to relative to the existing knowledge from the 
literature. We now turn to consider these special cases one by one.  
Firstly, in the absence of efficiency wage considerations we can reformulate (13) 
according to 
.
)1(1
1
1
)14( b
r
wN
++
-
+
=
t
h
b
 
 
Thus, in the absence of efficiency wage considerations the wage-moderating effect of 
profit sharing is stronger as it is not reduced through the increased cost of effort 
provision. In this case the total wage elasticity of labour demand is reduced to the 
conventional elasticity. 
Secondly, if all the bargaining power lies with the union ( 1=b ), the Nash 
bargaining solution is simplified to the monopoly union solution 
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.
1
1
)1(1
1)15(
*
*
b
r
wM
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
++
-=
g
h
t
h
h
 
In particular, (15) demonstrates explicitly how efficiency wage considerations and profit 
sharing impact on the optimal wage setting of a monopoly union. Profit sharing will 
reduce the base wage, while efficiency wage considerations will raise it. In the absence of 
efficiency wage considerations and profit sharing, (15) implies the well-known monopoly 
wage .
10,0
bwM
-
=== h
h
tg  
Thirdly, if all the bargaining power lies with the firm ( 0=b ), the wage would be 
determined so as to maximize the expected profits. From (13) this case yields  
 
.
1
1
)1(1
1
)16( b
r
wC
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
++
=
g
h
t
 
 
According to (16) introduction of profit sharing makes it possible to reduce the base wage 
of the workers even below the conventional outside option.   
 Now we turn to explore the negotiated profit sharing and its determinants. In 
terms of profit sharing we can solve the equation defined by the first-order condition 
(11b) to yield the following implicit representation of the negotiated profit share  
 
(17)   
X
XN
bgh
bgh
t
--+
-+-
=
)1(1
)1()1(
     
where 1
1
1
)1(
1
1
1
0 <
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
+
-
+
=<
g
h
t r
A
A
X  with 
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
++
-
+
=
g
h
t
h
b
1
1
)1(1
1
1 *
r
A denoting 
the mark-up whereby the negotiated base wage Nw exceeds the outside option b . For the 
details of the calculations leading to (17) we refer to Appendix B. From (17) we can 
directly infer that the negotiated profit share is an increasing function of the union’s 
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bargaining power, i.e. .0>
¶
¶
b
t N
 In particular, by allocating the bargaining power 
completely to the firm or to the union we obtain the following two special cases:  
 
(18)    1
)1(1
)1(
0
0
<
-+
-
=<
= gh
gh
t
b
c   and   1
1
=
=b
t M    . 
 
In its general implicit form (17) represents a polynomial equation of the third 
degree. In general, we can guarantee the existence of solutions to such equations, but an 
explicit characterization of the roots might often be very cumbersome.  
We can now summarize our general analysis of the negotiated profit share by  
 
Proposition 3: The Nash bargaining solution for the profit share, characterized in 
implicit form by (17), is increasing in the bargaining power of the union, and it also 
depends on the wage elasticity of labour demand, the elasticity of disutility of effort as 
well as on the cost of capital. 
 
Hence, higher bargaining power of the trade union will increase profit sharing, 
ceteris paribus. We can exemplify (17) for the case with 2=h . In this case (17) is 
reduced to the following quadratic equation: 
 
(19)  0
)1)(1(2)1)(1(2
)1)(1)(1(12 =
-+
-
-+
+-+--+
+
g
gt
g
bgbg
t
rr
r
, 
 
the explicit solution of which can be easily characterized. For example, it can be verified 
that 1=t  for the special case with 1=b . 
 
V.  Profit Sharing and Equilibrium Unemployment 
 
After having solved the sequence of decisions from a partial equilibrium 
perspective we now move on to explore the implications of profit sharing on equilibrium 
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unemployment in a general equilibrium framework. Our goal is to characterize the 
equilibrium unemployment as a function of the institutional features of the labour market, 
in particular the labour market imperfections, defined by the relative bargaining power of 
the trade union, and the coverage of the unemployment benefit system in terms of the 
benefit -replacement ratio.    
Until now our wage bargaining analysis has referred to a representative industry, 
say i. By (13), for each representative industry the generalized Nash bargaining solution 
has the form 
 
(20)        bAw i
N
i =   
 
where the wage mark-up iA  is defined by  
(21)
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
++
-
+
=
g
h
t
h
b
1
1
)1(1
1
1 *
r
Ai  . 
 
For simplicity we focus on an economy with identical industries so that AAi = .  
In a general equilibrium context the term b  should be re-interpreted to be the 
relevant outside option. We specify the outside option as   
 
( ) ,1)22( BuE
L
wub N +÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ +-= p
t
 
 
where u  denotes the unemployment rate, B  the unemployment benefit and Nw  is the 
negotiated wage rate in all the identical industries [for a standard justification we refer to, 
for example, Layard et. al. (1991), pp. 100-101]. The formulation (22) captures the idea 
that all the identical industries adopt profit sharing so that an unemployed worker faces 
the probability (1-u) of being employed in another industry, which makes use of a similar 
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compensation scheme. We further restrict ourselves to the case of a constant benefit-
replacement ratio NwBq º . 
 We now formulate the following intuition-based conjecture for the employment 
effects of profit sharing in a general equilibrium context. In light of the Nash bargaining 
solution (13), profit sharing will have a wage-moderating effect, thereby contributing to a 
reduction in the outside option (22), and thus stimulating employment. On the other hand, 
increased profit sharing will add a direct positive effect to the relevant outside option, 
which will run counter to the wage -moderating effect. Finally, the unemployment 
compensation will add to the relevant outside option. If the benefit replacement ratio, ,q  
is sufficiently high, the wage moderating effect of profit sharing makes it more likely that 
the overall effect of profit sharing is employment-enhancing. Thus, from the form of the 
relevant outside option in the general equilibrium context, we have reasons to conjecture 
that profit sharing could stimulate employment as long as the benefit replacement ratio is 
sufficiently high so as to make the wage-moderating effect of profit sharing dominate 
relative to its direct effect. Our formal analysis will, in fact, confirm this intuition.  
Next we turn to the formal analysis. Combining (20), (22) and the assumption of a 
constant replacement ratio we find that the aggregate unemployment rate can be 
expressed according to 
 
1
)1(
1
1
)1(1
1
1
1
1
)23(
-
+
+-
-
+
+-
=
+-
+-
=
h
t
h
t
pt
pt
r
q
r
A
Lw
E
q
Lw
E
Au
N
NN   , 
where, by (21), 
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
++
-
+
=
g
h
t
h
b
1
1
)1(1
1
1 *
r
A  denotes the wage mark-up induced by 
the labour market imperfections. 
From (23) we can conclude that 0>
¶
¶
q
uN
 and 0>
¶
¶
A
uN
. Hence, a higher benefit -
replacement ratio and a higher wage mark-up, which is a positive function of the trade 
union’s bargaining power and a negative function of the total wage elasticity of labour 
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demand, will increase equilibrium unemployment. Further, differentiating (23) with 
respect to t  we find that   
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Substituting this together with the definitions of A and *h  into (24) yields after some 
rearrangements 
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We have characterized the negotiated profit share in the previous section so that  
formally, it does not, of course, make sense to conduct comparative statics with respect to 
an endogenous variable. Hence the comparative statics properties derived above can be 
evaluated at 0=t  in order to formally explore the employment consequences of 
introducing profit sharing into a fixed wage economy. Consequently, substituting 0=t  
into (25a) we find that 
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From (25b) we can conclude that the following relationship between profit sharing and 
equilibrium unemployment holds: 
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The threshold function ),,( hgbg , defined in (26), is strictly decreasing as a function of 
b  and strictly increasing as a function of h . Ceteris paribus, the value of 
2
1=g gives the 
highest threshold, which the actual benefit replacement ratio q  has to exceed for higher 
profit shares to decrease the equilibrium unemployment and vice versa. Moreover,  
),,( hgbg  satisfies the boundary conditions 01,0),,( ®®® gghgb asorasg . 
From (26) we can conclude that the impact of profit sharing on equilibrium 
unemployment is determined by the interplay between labour market institutions 
(captured by b ), labour market policy (captured by the replacement ratio q ), market 
conditions (captured by h ) as well as the disutility of effort (captured by g ). 
 We can summarize our analysis, which reached its culmination in (26), in  
 
Proposition 4: Introduction of profit sharing will reduce equilibrium unemployment if 
the benefit replacement ratio exceeds the threshold level ),,( hgbg , while the reverse 
happens if the benefit-replacement ratio is below this threshold. The threshold depends 
negatively on the bargaining power of the union and positively on the elasticity of labour 
demand, whereas the relationship between the threshold and the disutility of effort is non-
monotonic.  
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Broadly speaking, we can conclude from (26) that the introduction of profit 
sharing will reduce equilibrium unemployment under circumstances with sufficiently 
generous labour market policies and with sufficiently strong labour market imperfections, 
i.e. when both the benefit-replacement ratio and the relative bargaining power of trade 
unions are high. These circumstances are precisely those where the demand for 
employment-promoting policies are particularly high. Conversely, our model predicts 
that profit sharing might work very poorly as an employment-stimulating instrument, or 
even be a destructive from the point of view of employment, with sufficiently small 
labour market imperfections. 
 In Figures 3 and 4 we illustrate the threshold ),,( hgbg  as a function of the 
labour market institution (captured by b ), the labour market policy (captured by the 
replacement ratio q), the elasticit y of effort (captured by g ) and the wage elasticity of 
labour demand (captured by h ). On the upper side of the curves profit sharing serves as 
an instrument, which reduces equilibrium unemployment, while on the lower side the 
reverse happens. In Figure 3 the threshold ),,( hgbg  is drawn for three different values 
of g with a fixed value of h . In particular, Figure 3 illustrates that the threshold 
),,( hgbg  for profit sharing to stimulate employment is at its highest level when the 
elasticity of effort is .
2
1
=g  In Figure 4 we illustrate the impact of h  on the threshold 
),,( hgbg  by drawing this threshold for three different values of h , while keeping the 
value of g  fixed.   
 From the comparative statics properties of ),,( hgbg  we can directly draw the 
conclusion that profit sharing is more likely to stimulate employment the higher is the 
bargaining power of the trade union or the higher is the replacement ratio. Furthermore, 
profit sharing will always promotes employment as we approach the limit cases with 
0=g  or 1=g . Conversely, profit sharing can never be employment-enhancing in the 
absence of an institution of unemployment compensation.    
We can summarize the policy lesson to be drawn from Proposition 4 as follows. 
Profit sharing is an employment-enhancing instrument in environments with sufficiently 
‘rigid’ labour market institutions in the sense of sufficiently high benefit replacement 
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ratios and sufficiently strong bargaining power of the trade unions. Under these 
circumstances the employment-enhancing effect of profit sharing can be seen as a 
consequence of its wage-moderating effect. Profit sharing is more likely to stimulate 
employment the larger are the labour market imperfections in the sense of higher wage  
mark-ups.  
Our results, characterized in proposition 4, add new dimensions to the literature. 
We have shown that the impact of profit sharing on equilibrium unemployment depends 
on the relationship between the benefit replacement ratio and its critical value, which in 
turns depends on the mark-up factor, the wage elasticity of effort and the wage elasticity 
of labour demand. This critical value is a decreasing function of the labour market 
imperfections. Thus, increased labour market imperfections will increase the potential for 
profit sharing as employment -enhancing instrument. By emphasizing how the 
employment consequences of profit sharing depend on the interplay between labour 
market polices and labour market imperfections we add an important element to the 
policy-oriented literature. This literature (see, for example, Holmlund (1991), Layard and 
Nickell (1990) and Jerger and Michaelis (1999)) has referred to particular properties of 
the production technology, in particular the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital, as the decisive features for evaluations of the employment implications of profit 
sharing. In their models profit sharing would have no effect on equilibrium 
unemployment in the absence of efficiency wage considerations if the firms operate with 
a Cobb-Douglas technology.  
 
VI.  Conclusions    
 
This study has offered a unified framework for simultaneously analyzing the 
determination of employment, the effort provided by employed union members, the 
wage, and profit sharing under uncertainty generated by a stochastic revenue shock. We 
initially showed that employment depends negatively on the effective labour cost. The 
effective labour cost consists not only of the wage rate, but also the cost of capital. 
Further, the effort provision by union members was shown to depend positively on the 
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usual efficiency wage considerations, and we also characterized the effort-enhancing, i.e. 
productivity increasing effects of profit sharing, which lies in conformity with empirics. 
Base wage and profit share determination was analyzed by applying a generalized 
Nash bargaining solution, which extended the wage bargaining literature by incorporating 
not only efficiency wage considerations in the presence of revenue uncertainty, but also 
profit sharing. The negotiated profit share was demonstrated to increase with the relative 
bargaining power of the trade union. Further, profit sharing was proven to moderate the 
negotiated base wage if the induced effort-promoting effect does not cause extremely 
high disutility costs. 
Our analysis culminated in a characterization of how the equilibrium 
unemployment implications of profit sharing depend on the interplay between labour 
market policy and labour market imperfections. We proved that profit sharing will reduce 
equilibrium unemployment under conditions with sufficiently generous coverage of the 
unemployment benefit system and sufficiently strong relative bargaining power or 
unions. Under such circumstances profit sharing will induce moderations of the base 
wages so as to boost aggregate employment.  
Even though there is empirical evidence on the determinants of employment and 
wages, which lies in conformity with our findings (see e.g. Nickell (1997) or Nickell and 
Layard (1999)), it still remains an important task for future research to evaluate the 
interactions between the compensation structure and employment much more 
systematically than what has been done thus far. In terms of equilibrium unemployment 
consequences from profit sharing our analysis has highlighted the significance of labour 
market policy in the form of the  benefit-replacement ratio when profit sharing has 
positive effects on labour productivity. Under circumstances with sufficiently generous 
unemployment benefit systems profit sharing was shown to stimulate employment. 
Furthermore, this was shown to be more likely the higher is relative bargaining power of 
unions and the lower is the wage elasticity of labour demand. It is an interesting and 
unexplored area for future research to empirically test these predictions.       
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Nash bargaining wage rate 
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms 
p
p
E
E w  and 
EU
EU w in the first-order 
condition (11a) of the Nash bargaining.  We start by looking at the profit response by the 
firm to a change in the wage rate. The optimal employment decision of the firm has to 
satisfy the first-order condition ( ) .)1(0 1
h
l
p a
a
rw
aLE L
+
=Û= -  By taking account of 
this condition we find that [ ] ,01)1()1( <-+=ú
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where the elasticity of effort with respect to wage g=*
*
a
aw w is constant by (7). Hence, in 
light of equation (9) we can conclude that  
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As for the trade union side we find by combination of (10) and (9) that the ratio 
EU
EU w  
can be expressed according to  
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Lw w denotes the total wage elasticity of wage 
demand. Making use of the total wage elasticity of wage demand we can rewrite (A2) 
according to  
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Substituting (A1) and (A3) into equation (11a) of the text yields (12).    
  
 
Appendix B: Derivation of the Nash bargaining profit share  
 
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms 
p
pt
E
E
 and 
EU
EUt  in the first-order 
condition (11b) of the Nash bargaining for profit sharing and solves it to produce 
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equation (17) of the text. We first find that 
L
aL
EE a tt pp =  so that by using the 
properties of labour demand (6) and effort (7) equations we end up with  
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of the labour demand and the profit function we get   
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Now we can re-express the first-order condition (11b) as    
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After some manipulation we end up with 
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the negotiated mark-up between the base wage Nw  and the outside option b. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of the threshold ),,( hgbq  for various values ofg  )2( =h . 
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Figure 4. Illustration of the threshold ),,( hgbq  for various values ofh  )5.0( =g . 
